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Introduction
The Department of Defense (DOD) program, Horizontal Fusion (HF), was created in 2003 to usher in a new era in defense computation and communications. The Networked Basic Language Translation System (NetBLTS) was proposed and accepted as part of the U.S. Army Research Laboratory's (ARL's) offering of initiatives within the HF portfolio in 2003.
"NetBLTS enables non-linguists to quickly triage foreign documents and provides a translation aid to linguists. NetBLTS provides Optical Character Recognition (OCR), machine translation, and document management and indexing. Users can save extracted keywords and phrases, document translations, and foreign documents to a database repository for future analysis. The repository is accessible through the Horizontal Fusion Federated Search application." 1 An updated system security plan (SSP) was required for all HF initiatives. The SSP for NetBLTS provided information on all associated hardware and software, the architecture of the system, data storage, the secure facilities, security requirements, and availability of the system.
In the next several sections, we will talk about these various components and the difficulties created by them.
Background
The NetBLTS team worked in the DOD zero-tolerance security environment. In the event of any security infraction, the NetBLTS application had to be taken immediately offline to correct the deficiency.
The NetBLTS team worked with other HF teams (such as the test and integration team at Space and Naval Warfare in South Carolina and the HF production and the HF management teams in Virginia), to develop and test new NetBLTS application features. Throughout the software development cycle, the NetBLTS code went through different stages of testing to ensure security and operability.
Hardware and Software
The NetBLTS computer servers consisted of five Dell PowerEdge * rack-mounted systems:
• NETBLTSDB4 (PowerEdge 2850) primary web and database (DB) server
• NETBLTS4WK1 (PowerEdge 2650) language-translation and backup server
• NETBLTS4WK2 (PowerEdge 2650) language-translation server ** NETBLTSWK1-NETBLTSWK4 shared the language translation load. This gave the NetBLTS system redundancy in case of a failure and allowed it to distribute the backend processing load. The Oracle database software was selected because of its structural-query language extensions, which support Google-like † † searches of stored documents. The Oracle database stored previously translated documents, as well as the Universal Description, Discovery and Integration (UDDI) binding cache service profiles.
Facility Security
The NetBLTS team was based at the U.S. Army Aberdeen Proving Ground (APG), MD, but was temporarily detailed to the Adelphi Laboratory Center (ALC) in Adelphi, MD, which housed the NetBLTS unclassified servers. ALC is a DOD installation and requires government-issued identification to gain entry. Within ALC, the NetBLTS servers resided in a secure room protected by a combination lock. The servers also required a username and password in order to gain access.
The Ground Intelligence Support Agency Command (GISA) at Ft. Bragg, North Carolina, housed the classified NetBLTS servers. Gaining entrance to GISA's secure area required users to have a higher security clearance than ALC or APG, unless they had an approved escort.
In addition to working on the nonclassified internet protocol router network (NIPRNet), the NetBLTS developers used the secret internet protocol router network (SIPRNet) to interact with the GISA personnel supporting the project. The developers accessed the SIPRNet from classified enclaves located at APG and ALC. Access to the enclaves required a security clearance. The APG and ALC enclaves are accredited for classified computing and are protected accordingly, as required by the Defense Information System Agency (DISA).
Information Assurance Vulnerability Alerts and Waivers
New vulnerabilities are constantly discovered in commercial off-the-shelf software. These vulnerabilities are a threat to DOD information systems. To combat and correct these threats, the DOD releases information assurance vulnerability alerts (IAVAs). An IAVA provides a compliance deadline for system administrators (SAs) to correct the vulnerability. If the compliance deadline is not met, the information system may have its Internet access revoked. All SA duties were performed by the NetBLTS team. Since the team was headquartered at APG, meeting the short compliance period was difficult because the servers were located at different locations. Getting blocked from the Internet was unacceptable for NetBLTS because of the customer requirement to maintain uptime twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week (24/7). Since NetBLTS had to maintain a 24/7 uptime, and development software would sometimes break using updated software, the NetBLTS team had to contact the information assurance manager in writing to request a special waiver that allowed NetBLTS servers to be updated manually. See appendix A for the NetBLTS waiver.
Once the waiver was in place, each time an IAVA was issued, the NetBLTS team had to submit a request to the HF management to get approval to apply the patch. This usually took time and hindered development. In addition, the team had to go through the process of backing up all of the data on the servers and determining if the patch for the vulnerability would break functionality of the translation services. Next, based on the findings and consultation with HF management, the team would seek approval to take down the servers and apply the patches.
The most difficult patches to apply were the Oracle-database patches. Because the NetBLTS team did not have direct access to the patches, it had to request the patch from a contractor. The NetBLTS team found that because of the customized Oracle installations, Oracle patches had a tendency not to execute properly and required several modifications to get them to work correctly.
Once the patches were successfully applied, the team would then bring the servers back online and thoroughly test the translation service to verify correct functionality. Only after successfully completing tests for system stability and language translation could the team let the HF community know that NetBLTS was back online and operational.
Gold Disks
The Gold Disks are a collection of patches stored on a compact disk that are distributed on a monthly basis by the DISA. Gold Disks provide a graphical interface that enables the user to choose one of two standards: gold or platinum. The gold standard is the minimum level of security required for network access. The platinum standard is a more restrictive level of security used for certification and accreditation. In HF, NetBLTS was required to maintain the gold standard. Periodically, a HF security representative visited the development site to verify that the gold standard was being met. The gold standard metrics per initiative/program were as follows:
• no category I findings
• no more than 20 category II findings
• arbitrary number of allowable category III findings at Designated Approval Authority discretion An example of a category I finding is detecting a server that does not have active DOD antivirus software. A category I finding is considered critical and, if left uncorrected, would result in removing the offending service from the HF offering. There are no exceptions; correcting all category I security flaws is mandatory for reinstatement.
An example of a category II finding is detecting a server that is not enforcing the proper minimum password age. The more frequently a password is changed, the less likely it will be compromised. A category II finding is considered important and should be corrected immediately. Up to 20 category II findings are allowed, but not recommended, for continued service operation.
An example of a category III finding is detecting a server allowing remote floppy disk access. A floppy disk should be accessible solely to users who are logged onto a system locally. A category III finding is considered moderate but should still be fixed, if possible.
The NetBLTS system administrator applied appropriate patches to correct security violations. However, any Gold Disk prescribed patch had the potential to harm the functionality of system. The system administrator had to test the system after each patch to ensure correct operational capability. The Gold Disks were a key part of NetBLTS that ensured all systems were secure.
Auditing
HF management required that all initiatives, including NetBLTS, perform auditing to maintain usage logs. Some of the required audits and logs were automatically maintained by the operating system and were accessible using the in-place administrative tools, such as the Log Viewer.
*
Audits not automatically handled by the operating system required the team to develop and integrate new logging functions into the NetBLTS service. The development effort was time consuming-it required the NetBLTS team to create necessary auditing code and review the created log files to verify that all necessary functions were present and ensure that no security violations had been introduced via the solution.
The required audits/logs were as follows:
• system startup/shutdown
• authentication logon/logoff
• process invocation (when a process is started or ended)
• make an object available (bringing data online to the portfolio)
• map an object to a subject (reading data)
• object modification (modifying data)
• make an object unavailable (closing files and file systems)
• object creation (creation of data or data structures)
• object deletion (deletion of data or data structures)
• Discretionary-access-control changes
• unsuccessful data access attempt (access denials)
• actions by trusted users (admin/operator action -all service-oriented architecture [SOA] and system actions)
• insufficient privilege
• resource denials
• Interprocess communications (IPC) functions (IPC within the SOA)
• process modification * Log Viewer is a registered trademark of Microsoft Corporation.
• audit subsystem events (changes to the HF DAC+ audit settings)
• subsystem events
• use of privilege
• authorization/permission granting (use of authorizations)
• set sensitivity label (override or modifications of data labels or markings)
For review, the NetBLTS team provided specific examples to the HF security team on how it met these requirements. The HF security team analyzed the document and, when necessary, traveled to the development site to verify compliance with the necessary auditing/logging requirements. See appendix B for the NetBLTS auditing report.
Conclusion
The HF program provided real-time military operational support to soldiers in the field. Therefore, the program had to adopt a zero-tolerance security policy. That decision resulted in strict security requirements for the NetBLTS initiative. Because of the combined effects of the short compliance time, the location of the servers, and not being able to access the systems remotely, security was a hindrance on the team and took away valuable time from software development. The NetBLTS team would have been better served if it initially moved the servers to APG. In the future, system security should reside with an SA whose sole job is to maintain the systems and who is co-located with the systems. By doing this, a better balance of security vs. functionality can be achieved. Query response (found set)
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